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Reallocating Letter of Credit Risks:
Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank
I. Introduction
In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank I the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the question of whether to recognize and apply
the law of a foreign nation to excuse the defendant's obligation
under a letter of credit. Normally, such a decision would rest on a
weighing of policy concerns under a conflict of laws analysis,2 and
the court's decision would have relatively little effect on the substan-
tive law in the United States. This court, however, rooted its deci-
sion in a definition that it created for "place of performance" in the
context of the law of letters of credit. 3
This Note will begin by considering the complex facts and his-
tory of the Chuidian case. The basic law of letters of credit will then
be discussed, followed by an outline of the legal principles governing
a conflict of laws analysis and by a discussion of relevant case law.
This Note will close by discussing the method of analysis used by the
Ninth Circuit and the problems and impact that such an analysis
presents. The purpose of this Note is to highlight concerns arising
from this court's method of analysis, rather than to evaluate the final
result of recognizing Philippine law.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Early Events
In 1980, Asian Reliability Company, Inc. (ARCI), a Philippine
corporation, received a loan guarantee of $25 million from the Phil-
I No. 90-56031, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992) [hereinafter,
Chuidian III]. An earlier, nearly identical decision of October 1, 1992 was published at 976
F.2d 561. Two sentences were amended after that publication and the entire decision was
again filed on December 11, 1992. Therefore, this Note will reference the opinion avail-
able in LEXIS because it is the final opinion.
2 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 2990 (1992) (applying federal common law conflict of laws analysis to
conclude that New York law controlled rather than Philippine law, and holding that the
bank's performance was not excused by illegality in the Philippines); J. Zeevi and Sons,
Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
866 (1975) (weighing factors typical of a conflict of laws analysis to determine that New
York laws applied and that illegality under a Ugandan executive order would not excuse
performance in New York).
3 Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 32318 at *5.
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ippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PG).4 Vin-
cent Chuidian, a Philippine citizen living in the United States, was a
98% shareholder in ARCI. 5 After ARCI defaulted on the loan, and
caused PG to become liable through the guarantee, PG brought suit
in Santa Clara County Superior Court alleging that Chuidian had
misappropriated the funds for his own use and for investment in
concerns outside of the scope of the loan guarantee.6 The parties
entered into a settlement carried out through a stipulated judgment
under which (1) Chuidian surrendered to PG shares of stock in
ARCI, Dynetics, Inc., and Interlek Semicondutors, Inc., and (2) PG
agreed to pay Chuidian $5.3 million "to be paid by means of an ir-
revocable letter of credit from a United States Bank." 7
After Ferdinand Marcos fell from power in 1986, PG went back
to the Santa Clara County Superior Court seeking to vacate the stip-
ulated judgment on the grounds of fraud and coercion.8 PG claimed
that Chuidian threatened Marcos, who then forced PG to enter into
the settlement. 9 PG also cited the order of the Presidential Commis-
sion on Good Government (PCGG) 16 that forbade the Philippine Na-
tional Bank (PNB) to make payment on the $5.3 million letter of
credit, as a basis for vacating the judgment." The lower court de-
nied the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment and that decision
was affirmed on appeal. 12
B. The Present Case
PNB's Los Angeles (PNB-LA) branch'3 was the designated place
of payment for the letter of credit arising from the settlement agree-
ment. 14  Based on the Philippine executive order, PNB-LA refused
to honor Chuidian's request for payment on the letter of credit.' 5
Chuidian brought suit against PNB in Los Angeles County Superior
4 Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 734 F. Supp. 415, 417 (C.D. Cal.
1990)[hereinafter Chuidian I], aff'd, No. 90-56031, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 (9th Cir.
Dec. 11, 1992).
5 Id.
6 Id. The proceeds of the loan were supposed to be used for investment in industrial
projects in the Philippines. PG alleged that the funds were instead used for Chuidian's
personal benefit and to invest in two Silicon Valley corporations, Dynetics, Inc. and In-
terlek Semiconductor, Inc., in violation of the terms of the loan. Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guar. Corp. v. Chuidian, 267 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
7 Philippine Export, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 460, 461, 468.
10 Chuidian III, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *2. The PCGG was established by
the Aquino government to recover wealth which Marcos improperly diverted from the
public. Id.
II Philippine Export, 267 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460-61.
12 Id. at 460.
13 Chuidian 1, 734 F. Supp. 415, 419 (C.D. Cal. 1990). PNB's witnesses admitted that
PNB-LA is only a branch of PNB-Manila, and is not a separate bank. Id.
14 Id.
'B Id. at 418.
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Court.16 The case was removed to federal district court, where cer-
tain officials of the Philippine government were added as defend-
ants" and where PG intervened to reassert its allegations of fraud in
the underlying settlement agreement.' 8 The primary issue at stake
in the federal district court case was whether PNB had any defenses
available to properly avoid payment on an irrevocable letter of
credit. 19
1. The District Court
The district court considered two defenses that would excuse
PNB from liability under the letter of credit. The first was fraud and
duress in the underlying settlement agreement.20 The court rejected
this defense. 2' A different line of defense, however, was recognized
by the court, which offered alternative holdings that PNB's perform-
ance was excused because (1) it was illegal or (2) the doctrines of
comity and act of state meant that the Philippine executive order
should be observed by a U.S. court. 22 The district court therefore
held that the settlement agreement between PG and Chuidian was
valid, but that performance of the letter of credit arising under that
settlement agreement was excused because it was illegal, or in the
alternative, because the doctrines of comity and act of state gave the
Philippine executive order validity in the United States. 23
2. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court decision, but focused solely on the illegality of performance in
the Philippines. 24 In its opinion, the court of appeals held that un-
less a confirming bank is involved in the transaction, place of per-
formance is to be determined by looking to the location of the bank
16 Id.
17 See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter,
Chuidian 11]. Chuidian claimed that these officials had intentionally interfered with his con-
tractual relations with the bank. Id. at 1097. The suit against these defendants was dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. Id.
18 Chuidian 1, 734 F. Supp. 415, 418 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 425. The district court reasoned that if there was any fraud or duress, it
occurred between Marcos and Chuidian, and not between Chuidian and PG. Id. at 418.
The court determined that PG had entered into the original settlement with Chuidian
"only after the terms of the settlement were thoroughly considered and discussed by the
[PG] board and the profitability of Interlek and Dynetics was analyzed." Id. at 425. Be-
cause there was no showing that a fraud was actually perpetrated against PG and there was
a showing that PG had an adequate opportunity to evaluate the terms of the settlement,
the court reasoned that PG was under no fraud or duress at the time of the settlement. Id.
22 Id. at 420.
23 Id. at 425.
24 Chuidian III, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 32318 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992).
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issuing the letter of credit. 25 By thus defining "place of perform-
ance," the court concluded that Chuidian's letter of credit was to be
performed in the Philippines since PNB-Manila was the issuing
bank. 26 Because (1) performance was illegal in the Philippines 27 and
(2) conflict of laws analysis supported the theory of no liability since
payment on the letter of credit was illegal at the place of perform-
ance,2 8 the court held that PNB was excused from its obligation
under the letter of credit. 29 The court declined to address the issues
of comity and act of state.30
3. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Fernandez argued that the majority chose
the wrong definition of "place of performance."'3 In his view, the
place of performance should be the place(s) where payment is to oc-
cur under the letter of credit, rather than the location of the issuing
or confirming banks.3 2
Under the place of issuance rule, the issuing bank has the most pro-
tection against the vagaries of the legal climate and the risk of ille-
gality is borne by the beneficiary. Under the place of payment rule,
the beneficiary has the most protection .... [The place of payment
rule) more closely reflects the customary allocation of risk in letter
of credit transactions and fosters the stability of those
transactions.3 3
Judge Fernandez alluded to the distinction between the various
banks' locations and their obligations.34 His dissent cited other court
decisions, the Uniform Commercial Code, and commentators to sup-
port the policy argument for this definition and its effect on letter of
credit transactions.3 5 He also added that if he had to decide on com-
ity and act of state grounds, he would nonetheless hold PNB liable
on the letter of credit.36 Essentially, the dissent argued that the Phil-
ippine executive order should not be recognized in the United States
because the resulting excuse of performance offends banking law
policy in California and the United States.
25 Id. at *6.
26 Id. at *8.
27 Id.
28 Id. at *9. Place of performance is one of the factors considered in a conflicts of law
analysis used for determining which nation's law is to be applied. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, was also considering place of performance in the context of the law of contracts in
deciding whether there was a defense for illegality.
29 Id. at * 14.
30 Id. The issue of comity, however, is inherent in a conflict of laws analysis, so the
court really did address this issue to some extent.
31 Id. (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at * 15 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at *22-23 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 021 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at *25 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at *25 n.1 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
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III. Background Law
A. Letters of Credit - Generally
An internationally recognized definition of letters of credit is as
follows:
[A]ny arrangement.., whereby a bank (the issuing bank), acting at
the request and on the instructions of a customer (the applicant for
the credit), (i) is to make a payment to, or to the order of a third
party (the beneficiary), or is to pay or accept bills of exchange
(drafts) drawn by the beneficiary, or (ii) authorizes another bank to
effect such paYment, or to pay, accept, or negotiate such bills of
exchange.. .3
Letters of credit represent transactions that are entirely separate and
distinct from the underlying contract(s) giving rise to the credit
relationship. 3 8
1. Relationships Among Parties to a Letter of Credit
A basic letter of credit transaction involves a customer, an is-
suer, and a beneficiary. The customer is the party who obtains credit
from a bank.3 9 Usually the customer will be a buyer of goods who
uses the letter of credit to assure a seller that payment will in fact be
made on the goods. The issuer is the bank, or other party, to whom
the customer has applied for credit. 40 By issuing the letter of credit,
the bank essentially guarantees payment to the beneficiary, regard-
less of the customer's financial status. 4 1 So long as the requirements
in the letter itself are met, the issuer will be obligated, under the
letter of credit, to pay the beneficiary. 4 2 Therefore the issuing bank,
not the beneficiary, bears the risk of the customer's potential insol-
vency.43 The beneficiary, then, is the party who is protected by and
who receives payment under the letter of credit. 44
Letters of credit are used commonly in international trade. The
buyer and the seller of goods or services may be located in different
nations and not have any previous business experience with one an-
other. As a result, the seller may be uncertain about the buyer's abil-
ity to pay for the goods or services. The seller wants some type of
assurance that payment will be forthcoming upon the performance
37 UNIF. CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, art. 2 (1983 Rev.) [here-
inafter UCP]. The UCP has no binding legal effect on letters of credit except to the extent
that parties' reference it in the letter. Id.
38 UCP, supra note 37, art. 3. See also U.C.C. § 5-109 (1978) and JOHN F. DOLAN, THE
LAW OF LETrERS OF CREDIT 3.01 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter DOLAN].
39 U.C.C. § 5-103(g) (1978).
40 U.C.C. § 5-103(c) (1978).
41 See U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1978).
42 Id.
43 See Chuidian III, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 32318 at *22 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992) (Fer-
nandez, J., dissenting) (citing JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 3.07[2]
(2d ed. 1991)).
44 See U.C.C. § 5-103(d) (1978).
1993]
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of the contract. The buyer thus obtains a letter of credit for the ben-
efit of the seller to assure payment and to protect the seller from
potential problems associated with seeking a judgment in a foreign
jurisdiction.45
Often it arises that the issuer and the beneficiary are also in dif-
ferent nations, or that the beneficiary does not completely trust the
creditworthiness of the bank issuing the letter of credit. In such
cases, it may be necessary for another entity to become involved in
the credit transaction.46 The issuer will seek a bank that is local and
trustworthy to the beneficiary to act as an intermediary on the letter
of credit. This intermediary bank can assume one of two general
roles: that of advising bank or that of confirming bank.47 In either
case, the intermediary will usually be the bank where payment is
made.
The primary distinction between a confirming bank and an ad-
vising bank is the extent of the obligation that the intermediary bank
assumes under the letter of credit. "[A]n advising bank by advising a
[letter of] credit issued by another bank does not assume any obliga-
tion to honor drafts drawn or demands for payment made under the
credit but it does assume obligation for the accuracy of its own state-
ment."'48 An advising bank's role is simply to tell the beneficiary that
the letter of credit has been issued, and it will only be liable for the
accuracy of the information which it conveys to the beneficary. 49
The advising bank is not required to make any payments to the
beneficiary.
The confirming bank, on the other hand, "by confirming a credit
becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirma-
tion as though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of an is-
suer."50 Here, the beneficiary, upon meeting the requirements of
the letter of credit, can demand payment from the confirming bank,
which will be liable for payment of the credit. 51 Through this rela-
tionship, the risk of nonpayment by the issuing bank is shifted from
the beneficiary to the confirming bank. 52
2. Irrevocability
Letters of credit can be revocable or irrevocable. 53 A revocable
letter of credit can be withdrawn at any time without prior notifica-
45 See DOLAN, supra note 38, 3.07[3] - [5].
46 See DOLAN, supra note 38, 1.03.
47 Id.
48 U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1978).
49 U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1978); see also UCP, supra note 37, art. 8.
50 U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1978).
51 Id.
52 See id.
53 See U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1978); UCP, supra note 37, art. 7(a).
[VOL. 18730
LETTERS OF CREDIT
tion to the beneficiary. 54 An irrevocable letter of credit, once estab-
lished with the beneficiary, can only be altered with the consent of
the beneficiary. 55 Once the beneficiary has complied with the terms
of the letter, the issuer must honor the obligation created by the let-
ter of credit. 56
B. Grounds for Excusing the Obligation of the Issuer
An issuer may be excused from its liability on a letter of credit
through circumstances arising under the terms of the letter itself or
through problems presented by fraud, bankruptcy, foreign relations,
boycotts, and matters related to the underlying contract.57 The first
type of excuse, then, would involve interpretation of the letter of
credit contracts, while the second type of excuse would involve a
broader range of inquiries.
It is important, however, to remember that the letter of credit
involves a transaction independent of the underlying contract, the
function of which plays a very significant role in the financial world
and especially in international trade.58 The underlying contract de-
fines rights as between the seller and buyer. A letter of credit, on
the other hand, involves a series of related contracts: one contract
between the customer and the issuer; one contract between the is-
suer and the beneficiary; more contracts, potentially, between an in-
termediary bank and each of the issuer and the beneficiary. Each of
the letter of credit contracts is unrelated to the underlying contract
between the buyer and seller.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code
The U.C.C. recognizes the special commercial significance of
letters of credit through a separate article intended to control such
transactions. 59 Article 5 sets out the rights and duties of the issuer
when the documents presented by the beneficiary appear on their
face to comply with the terms of the letter of credit but in fact these
documents either do not comply, are fraudulent, or are tainted by
"fraud in the transaction. ' 60 The U.C.C. thus recognizes a very lim-
ited range of events which will excuse the obligation of the issuer.6'
Unless the demanding party is an innocent holder of the letter of
54 U.C.C. § 5-106(3) (1978).
55 U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1978). An irrevocable letter of credit may expire by its own
terms, but cannot be terminated earlier without the consent of both parties. Id.
56 See U.C.C. § 5-114 (1978). The issuer's obligation is limited, however, by the
terms of the letter of credit itself. Id.
57 See DoLAN, supra note 38, 7.04, 9.06, 12.02.
58 See UCP, supra note 37, art. 3.
59 See U.C.C. art. 5 (1978); see also DOLAN, supra note 38, 3.01 (discussing the distinc-
tion between principles of letters of credit specifically and contracts generally).
60 U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1978).
61 See id.
1993]
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credit, the issuer may, in good faith, refuse payment if (1) there has
not been compliance with the terms of the letter; (2) the documents
are fraudulent; or (3) there was "fraud in the transaction.- 6 2 These
references to fraud mean actual fraud, and the burden will be on the
issuer to establish these facts as a defense. 63
2. Illegality and Conflict of Laws
If payment on the letter of credit is illegal, certainly the issuer's
dishonor will be excused. 64 The rule is quite simple if all of the par-
ties are in the same jurisdiction and their acts are only subject to that
jurisdiction's law. However, letters of credit are rarely so confined,
and acts legal in one jurisdiction may not be legal in another. When
such a jurisdictional conflict arises, a conflict of laws analysis is nec-
essary to decide what is illegal. Such an analysis in the area of the
law of letters of credit should recognize that these contractual trans-
actions are to be treated differently than contracts generally by virtue
of the fact that the U.C.C. devotes an entire article to letters of
credit. 65 "The rules embodied in the Article can be viewed as those
expressing the fundamental theories underlying letters of credit"-
theories that a conflict of laws analysis in this area should respect. 66
a. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws Approach
Section 202 Illegality
(1) The effect of illegality upon a contract is determined by the law
selected by application of the rules of [sections] 187-188.
(2) When performance is illegal in the place of performance, the
contract will usually be denied enforcement.
6 7
The referenced sections generally stand for the idea that a given
state's law should be applied, notwithstanding the parties' contrac-
tual choice of law, if that state has a significant interest in the con-
tract.68 The significance of a state's interest in the contract is
determined by a weighing of
(1) the needs of international systems, (2) the relevant policies of the
forum, (3) the relevant policies of other jurisdictions and their rela-
tive interests in determination of the issue, (4) protection ofjustified
62 Id.
63 DOLAN, supra note 38, 7.04[4][d]. The meaning of "fraud in the transaction" is
far from clear. Some courts have understood "fraud in the transaction" to excuse the
issuer's obligation if the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary is
somehow fraudulent. Other courts have refused to consider any aspect of the underlying
contract. See id.
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 202(2) (1971) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT]. Federal common law applies the RESTATEMENT principles to determine
choice of law in actions involving a foreign state or its instrumentalities. Chuidian Il1, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *9 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992).
65 See U.C.C., art. 5 (1978).
66 U.C.C. § 5-102, cmt. 2. (1978)
67 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 202.
68 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, §§ 187, 188.
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expectations, (5) basic policies underlying the field of law in issue,
(6) predictability of result and (7) ease in determination of the law to
be applied.6 9
These elements are to be considered in light of the places of con-
tracting, negotiation, and performance, as well as the location of the
subject matter and the parties' domicile and nationality. 70
b. Comity
Inherent in the potential application of foreign law under a con-
flict of laws analysis is the notion of comity. Comity is defined as
"the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, . . . [as an]
expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citi-
zens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." '7'
Recognition of a foreign law thus involves a policy decision
grounded in a host of concerns which a court must balance.
C. Case Law: Jurisdictional Conflict, Illegality, and International
Credit Obligations
Resolving the question of whether to recognize the conflicting
law of another jurisdiction to excuse performance of a letter of credit
requires consideration of many factors: the will of the parties, the
special status of letters of credit under the U.C.C., the international
economic function of banks, and international relations. Although
the facts in Chuidian are distinct, many courts encountered the princi-
pal issue-whether to recognize a foreign law when banking obli-
gatons are involved-and have resolved the disputes through a
balancing of the interests of the two jurisdictions, which is the basic
approach of a conflict of laws analysis.
In an often cited case, J. Zeevi and Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank
(Uganda) Ltd. ,72 the Court of Appeals of New York held that the is-
69 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 6.
70 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 188(2). Section 188(2) contains the following
provision:
In the absense of an effective choice of law by the parties ..., the contacts to
be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract
(c) the place of performance
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue.
71 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
72 333 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
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suer's obligation under the letter of credit was not excused based on
illegality abroad. 73 An executive order of the Ugandan government
made payment by the Ugandan issuing bank to the beneficiary, an
Israeli firm, illegal. 74 The factors important to the court in deciding
whether illegality in' Uganda would excuse the liability of the issuer
were that (1) New York was the designated place of payment in the
letter of credit; 75 (2) New York, as a financial center, had a significant
interest in the smooth and consistent enforcement of letters of credit
obligations; 76 and (3) the Ugandan order represented a policy which
was offensive to the citizens of New York. 77 Although this is a state
court opinion, the decision illustrates the balancing of concerns rele-
vant to the resolution of a problem quite similar to that presented in
Chuidian.
Banco de Vizcaya v. First National Bank of Chicago78 weighed similar
factors in deciding whether to hold the home office of First National
Bank of Chicago (FNBC) liable on a letter of credit that had been
issued by the Bank's Abu Dhabi branch. The customer had brought
suit in Abu Dhabi civil court and obtained an injuction against
FNBC-AD barring payment to the beneficiary. 79 Although FNBC in
Chicago was not a confirming bank, but only the bank where pay-
ment was to be made, the Court nonetheless applied Illinois law to
maintain the liability of the home branch under the letter of credit.80
The court recognized that its decision meant that FNBC could
face double liability-in the United States and in the United Arab
Emirates.8 ' This, the court indicated, is
a cost of doing business under a foreign sovereign. To rule other-
wise would shift the risk of doing business in Abu Dhabi to a party
which had relatively little involvement with that forum. Plaintiff rec-
ognized the risks of conducting business in Abu Dhabi and sought to
avoid them by bargaining for the right to be reimbursed in dollars in
73 Id.
74 Id. at 171.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 172.
77 Id. at 173.
78 514 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1981), vacated by unpublished order (July 23, 1981). This
decision was vacated because the parties entered into a settlement agreement and joined
in a motion to dismiss after the court's decision was filed. While the decision has no prece-
dential value, it does present a persuasive discussion in the area of conflict of laws analysis
and is cited in several sources: Chuidian II1, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at "18 (Fernan-
dez, J. dissenting); Donald T. Kramer, Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 A.L.R.
FED. 707 (Supp. 1992); Allan T. Schwartz, Construction and Effect of UCC Art. 5, Dealing with
Letters of Credit, 35 A.L.R.3D. 1404 (Supp. 1992); Robert A. Brazener, What Constitutes Rea-
sonable or Appropriate Relation to a Transaction with the Meaning of Uniform Commercial Code § 1-
105(1) 64 A.L.R.3D 341 (Supp. 1992);John S. Herbrand, Damages Recoverable for Wrongful
Dishonor of Letter of Credit under UCC § 5-115, 2 A.LR.4TH 665 (Supp. 1992).
79 First National Bank of Chicago, 514 F. Supp. at 1282.
80 Id. at 1284-85.
81 Id. at 1285.
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Chicago.8 2
After recognizing this element of risk allocation, the court cites the].
Zeevi & Sons reasoning and adds its own policy value that "enforce-
ment of irrevocable letters of credit is vital to international com-
merce and to Illinois which provides a forum for international
transactions."8 3
Sabolyk v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York 84 again in-
volved a weighing of factors from which the District Court for the
Southern District of New York decided that a Swiss court judgment
should be recognized, and thereby excused the New York bank from
liability under the letter of credit. 85 In that case, the letter of credit
transaction had no contact with New York other than the fact that the
issuing bank was a branch of a New York bank.86 The New York
branch was not designated as the place of payment, nor was it in any
way a participant in the credit transaction. 87 All aspects of the trans-
action, including performance, were in Zurich. 88 Clearly the Zurich
court had jurisdiction through the place of performance and through
its significant interests in the transaction as a whole.8 9 The court
concluded that the Swiss attachment did not offend any public pol-
icy 90 and thus applied comity in choosing the law of the Swiss court
as the law governing the letter of credit transaction. The court con-
cluded that (1) the Swiss court was acting in comity with another U.S.
court;9 ' (2) the effect of the decision on the commercial acceptability
of letters of credit was not significant;92 (3) the beneficiaries had not
made a sufficient effort to defend in Swiss court; 93 and (4) New York
Banking Law specifically protected the New York branch under the
facts. 94 All of these factors weighed heavily in the policy balancing
that led the court to recognize Swiss law.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover95 was a Supreme Court decision
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1286.
84 No. 84 Civ. 3179, 1984 WL 1275 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984).
85 Id.
86 Id. at *2.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. The court held that Zurich was the place of performance because the case was
before the U.S. court on a summary judgment motion, in which defendants filed an affida-
vit asserting that performance was to take place in Zurich. Id. The plaintiffs never con-
tested that claim by the defendants. Id. at *4.
90 Id. at *3.
91 See id. at *2 (citing the fact that the Swiss attachment was in response to a suit
brought by a third party alleging fraud in the underlying transaction, which was pending in
the District Court for the Southern District of Texas).
92 Id. at 04.
93 Id. Plaintiffs never made any effort to defend the Swiss action that resulted in the
attachment at issue, but rather were trying to attack the validity of the Swiss court's judg-
ment through a suit in the United States. Id.
94 See id. at *5 (citing N.Y. BANKING LAw § 183 (1) (McKinney 1971)).
95 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3542 (June 12, 1992).
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which arose in a different procedural posture requiring statutory
analysis to determine if United States courts had jurisdiction. This
case involved the application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA). 96 The FSIA addresses the situation where the
defendant in a suit is an entity of a foreign sovereign. 97 In this case,
the Republic of Argentina was being sued for its breach of obliga-
tions created under bonds which it sold on the New York stock mar-
ket.98 Under the FSIA, one of the requirements for exercising
jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign is that the entity must have
committed an act which had a "direct effect" in the United States. 99
To determine "direct effect," the Supreme Court applied an analysis
similar to a conflict of laws analysis for determining a state's interest
in action. The Court observed that (1) New York was the place des-
ignated in the contract for payment; (2) payments had been made in
New York; (3) the contract was a negotiable debt instrument which
could be sold anywhere in the world; (4) the debt instrument was
denominated in U.S. dollars; and (5) the defendant had appointed a
financial agent in New York.' 00 The Court then reasoned that New
York, as a state, had a significant interest in the transaction involved
and that there was a direct effect in the United States.' 0 ' The rele-
vancy of this case is in an analogy to the balancing of interests codi-
fied in the FSIA. Argentina's potential liability for payment of the
bonds, which had been excused in Argentina, depended on the
weight of U.S. interests. An issuer's liability on a letter of credit,
performance of which is illegal in another nation, could likewise be
resolved through a similar balancing of interests.
The Fourth Circuit decision of Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
Bank of Virginia,10 2 while not involving an illegality defense, illus-
trates a typical resolution to a conflict of laws problem in the context
of letters of credit. As a preliminary step to determining other is-
sues, the court applied Maryland choice of law rules which said that
"matters arising in connection with performance of the contract are
governed by the place of performance."'10 3 The court went on to
reason that
the letter of credit issued in this case required that the draft and
documents be presented 'at the counters' of the Bank of Virginia in
96 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1988).
97 Id.
98 Weltover, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3542 at '6, 7.
99 Id. at *8, 9 (citing U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988)).
100 Id. at *23.
101 Id. at *22, 23.
102 704 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1983).
103 Id. at 137, n.3. It is important to note that the Fourth Circuit applied Maryland
choice of law rules, rather than the rules of the Restatement or federal common law. The
Restatement rules consider factors other than just place of performance. This Fourth Cir-
cuit opinion is useful, though, for understanding how a court may define "place of
performance."
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Richmond, Virginia. The place of performance is Virginia, and
therefore the law of Virginia governs resolution of the issue here
presented. 104
This logic suggests that the Fourth Circuit is defining "place of per-
formance" for choice of law purposes, and not for letter of credit
purposes, as the place where payment was to be rendered.
RSB Manufacturing Corp. v. Bank of Baroda 105 fits into this analysis
because the facts are very similar to those of Chuidian, 10 6 which really
did not rest its decision to recognize foreign law on any conflict of
laws balancing. The district court for the Southern District of New
York held in RSB Manufacturing that "place of performance" must be
defined in order to determine whether the New York branch of the
Bank of Baroda could be held liable. 10 7 It then defined "place of
performance" for a letter of credit as the place of issuance because
only an issuing bank, and not an advising bank, is obligated under a
letter of credit. 10 8 The court took the position that since an advising
bank does not incur any obligation to make payment on the letter of
credit, "the original contractual obligation [is] not enlarged, and the
situs [place of performance] of the obligation remain[s] in [the juris-
diction of the issuing bank]."' 1 9 The court, in defining "place of
performance," was doing so only to determine the operation of a
New York Banking Law provision, 110 which was what finally relieved
the New York branch of liability." 'I The court did not engage in any
substantive conflict of laws analysis.
IV. Analysis
The Chuidian court majority began its analysis with the presump-
tion that if the place of performance was Manila, then performance
was excused because the executive order issued by the PCGG made
performance illegal. 1 2 No authority was specifically cited when the
court first raised the assertion that illegality at the place of perform-
ance will excuse performance, but the inference from the later dis-
cussion of conflict of laws is that the majority was relying on section
202(2) of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.' 1
The majority then attempted to define "place of performance"
104 Id.
105 15 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
106 Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 (9th Cir. Dec. I1, 1992). Both cases
involved the liability of U.S. branches of foreign banks where foreign law inhibited per-
formance of a letter of credit.
107 RSB Manufacturing, 15 B.R. at 652.
108 Id. at 653, 654.
109 Id. at 654.
1 10 Id. (citing N.Y. BANKING LAw § 204(a)(3)(a) (McKinney 1990)).
III Id.
112 Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992).
113 See id. Section 202 of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, is discussed later in the
court's opinion. Chuidan III, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *10.
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through an analysis of letters of credit law rather than by looking to
the rules of conflict of laws.' 14 The court relied on the decisions in
RSB Manufacturing115 and Sabolyk. 116 Unfortunately, the reliance on
Sabolyk represented a misunderstanding of that decision, 1 7 which
does not stand for the proposition that place of performance is to be
determined by looking to the place of issuance, as held in
Chuidian. "" The RSB Manufacturing decision is in accordance with
the Chuidian court's position." 19
As it pursued this line of analysis, the Ninth Circuit focused on
the fact that only issuing and confirming banks are obligated to pay
on letters of credit. 120 Although this is correct, the court translated
this notion of obligation into the rule that performance can only oc-
cur at the place where an obligation exists. 12 1 The court then of-
fered an unclear justification for its rule by reference to the policy
concern of flexibility in articulating rules governing letters of
credit. 122
The court failed to recognize that its rule deprives the forum of
a paying or advising bank of any interest which that forum may have
had through such a function. Surely the forum of the paying or ad-
vising bank has some interest in the transaction, even if it is only a
minor one. 123 The forum of the issuing bank already has a signifi-
cant interest in the transaction. This court's definition of "place of
performance" has the effect of limiting the potential forums that may
have a recognizable interest in the letter of credit transaction and
thus limits, rather than fosters, the variety of relationships that the
court sought to accord flexibility. 124
114 See Chuidian IIl, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *5, 6.
115 15 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See Chuidian III, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *5.116 No. 84 Civ. 3179, 1984 WL 1275 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984). See Chuidian 111, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *5.
117 The Sabolyk court was relying on an uncontested affidavit that, after listing many
factors beyond place of issuance, concluded that performance was to take place in Zurich.
Sabolyk, 1984 WL 1275 at *2. Accepting that Zurich was the place of performance, the
court was concerned with whether it should recognize a judgment of the Swiss court. Id. at
*3.
118 Id. at *5.
119 RSB Manufacturing focused on defining what the place of performance under a let-
ter of credit is rather than on weighing foreign and domestic concerns in determining
whether to excuse performance. See 15 B.R. at 653-54.
120 See Chuidian III, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *5-7 ; RSB Manufacturing, 15 B.R.
at 652-53.
121 Chuidian III, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *7; see also RSB Manufacturing, 15 B.R.
at 654.
122 See Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *6 (citing commentary to U.C.C.
§ 5-102(3)).
123 See J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Limited, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172
(N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 ("New York [the situs of the paying bank] has an
overriding and paramount interest in the outcome of this litigation .... [as] a financial
capital of the world, serving as an international clearinghouse and market place for a
plethora of international transactions.").
124 While it is true that the parties can explicitly designate a place of performance,
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Additionally, the majority opinion failed to recognize that there
is no reason why there cannot be two places of performance. 125 A
letter of credit involves a series of contracts: between the customer
and the issuer; between the issuer and the beneficiary; and perhaps
between the issuer and beneficiary, each, and an intervening bank.' 2 6
By their very nature, the series of contracts involved in a letter of
credit presents the possibility of more than one place of perform-
ance. If a beneficiary negotiates the letter of credit at the advising
bank, the performance is complete in relation to the beneficiary, who
then has received the benefit of his bargain, and the performance has
occurred at the location of the advising bank. Yet the credit transac-
tion remains incomplete in relation to the issuer who is now obli-
gated to the advising bank.127 Similarly, if the advising bank declines
to participate, performance may occur at the place of issuance.128
Thus, place of performance is relative to who is seeking performance
as well as to the obligations of the various parties.
After working through its policy argument for the definition of
"place of performance" in letters of credit law, the majority cited a
list of district court findings which it said "support[ed]" its finding
that Manila was the place of performance.' 29 These findings were
contacts which the credit transaction had with Manila.130 The major-
ity used them to further define "place of performance,"'' i and then
used them again, along with place of performance, in its conflict of
laws analysis.132 This mixing of analyses created a circular argument
that Judge Fernandez noted in his dissent.' 3 3 The conflict of laws
analysis "addresse[d] what effect one should give to an illegality once
it has been determined that performance is illegal at the place of per-
there may be reasons why a party would feel more comfortable engaging a forum only
through reference to an advising bank or paying bank. For instance, the other party may
feel, rationally or not, that its interest is threatened by such an explicit designation. A
compromise then could be reached by allowing each side to maintain an interest in its
chosen forum, without any explicit, potentially formidable designation.
125 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 188, cmt. a. If a confirming bank is involved,
clearly there are two potential places of performance since both the issuing bank and the
confirming bank are obligated on the letter of credit. Obligation, however, is only a part
of performance; the two words are not synonymous.
[P]lace of performance can bear little weight in the choice of the applicable
law when . . . performance by a party is to be divided more or less equally
among two or more states with different local law rules on the particular
issue.
Id.
126 See DOLAN, supra note 38, 7.01.
127 See U.C.C. § 5-114 (1978).
128 See UCP, supra note 37, art. 1 (c), 2 1(b).
129 See Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *7-8 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1992).
130 Id. at *7-8, 13.
131 Id. at *8 ("These findings . . . support our conclusion that Manila was the sole
place of performance.
132 See id. at "13.
133 See id. at *20 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
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formance .... It does not help with the determination of whether
Manila or California was the place of performance."' I3 4
The conflict of laws analysis should have been the starting point
and crux of the court's analysis.13 5 Place of performance is only one
factor to be considered in this analysis, though it is a significant
one.' 3 6 The Restatement recognizes that if there are two places of
performance, then that element of the conflict of laws analysis de-
serves less weight.' 3 7 A limiting, conclusive definition of "place of
performance," specifically isolated to letters of credit law, was un-
necessary for the resolution of the Chuidian case. The majority could
have rested its decision to recognize the Philippine executive order
on a broader conflict of laws analysis.' 38 The court noted the Re-
statement's general principles, but engaged in a very limited analysis
of weighing the various concerns as they were presented in the
case.' 3 9 A more expanded analysis of these general principles, as
they apply to the Chuidian facts, would have obviated the court's need
to define "place of performance."140
The dissenting opinion, which rejected the validity of the Philip-
pines' order, recognized that policy concerns need to be weighed. 141
Judge Fernandez articulated a very persuasive policy argument relat-
ing to banking concerns and risk allocation under letters of credit. 142
An irrevocable letter of credit is by its nature meant to be irrevoca-
ble in all but a few limited circumstances .... Recognizing the place
of payment as the place of performance in this case would effectuate
the parties' agreement and thus enhance the 'reliability and fluidity'
of letters of credit.143
The dissent failed, however, to recognize that "place of perform-
134 Id. (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
'35 See, e.g., J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Limited, 333 N.E.2d 168
(N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (relying on a conflict of laws analysis in deciding not
to recognize foreign law); Sabolyk v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, No.
84 Civ. 3179, 1984 WL 1275 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984) (recognizing a foreign judgment
after weighing factors important under a conflict of laws analysis).
136 RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, §§ 188(2), 202(2).
137 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 188, cmt. a.
1t3 Compare Sabolyk, 1984 WL 1275 (relying on state law and public policy considera-
tions under a conflict of laws analysis in upholding a foreign judgment) with RSB Manufac-
turing Corp. v. Bank of Baroda, 15 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defining place of
performance of a letter of credit to determine that performance was excused because pay-
ment on the letter was illegal at that defined place).
139 The court only weighs the Restatement section 188(2) factors in its discussion,
completely skipping an analysis of the Restatement section 6 general principles. See
Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *9-14 & "12 n.2. See also supra notes 64-70
and accompanying text.
140 CompareJ. Zeevi & Sons, 333 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1975) with Chuidian 111, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 32318.
141 See Chuidian I1, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32318 at *22 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 022-23 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at *24 (Fernandez, J. dissenting) (citing Bank of Cochlin Ltd. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust, 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), afftd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir.
1986)).
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ance" should not be the key to the decision. Because Judge Fernan-
dez disagreed with the result of the majority opinion, he instead
focused on an opposing definition of place of performance. None-
theless, he grounded his entire argument in decisions that have ap-
plied the conflict of laws or similar balancing approaches to
situations where an obligation is illegal under foreign law.' 44 These
decisions essentially used the broad principles of conflict of laws
analysis to decide what impact the foreign law should have in the
United States, and thus, stand as precedent for their method of analy-
sis as well as for their result.' 45 None of those courts saw a need to
define "place of performance" to resolve the conflicts.
V. Conclusion
This Note is not concerned with whether the result of excusing
liability on the letter of credit under the facts of this case was neces-
sarily the correct result. Rather, the focus is on the process which
the court used in reaching its decision and on recognition that the
dissenting opinion's policy concerns about the smooth functioning
of letters of credit and a shift in the allocation of risks among parties
to a letter of credit are valid. Conflict of laws rules function to allow
recognition of foreign laws without creating precedential impact
within our own system. The Chuidian court chose to allow a question
of the enforceability of a foreign law to create a new rule of domestic
substantive law that was not essential to its decision. Parties to let-
ters of credit traditionally have used place of payment as one method
of allocating the risks of the transaction. Under this court's rule,
designation of a place of payment in the United States will not be
enough to protect a beneficiary. Parties will have to explicitly state a
"place of performance" if it is to be other than or in addition to the
place of issuance. Yet, the place of issuance will remain a place of
performance because of the contractual nature of letters of credit. In
the end, courts will still be forced to balance the various interests
under a conflict of laws analysis when facts similar to those in
Chuidian arise.
JULIA ANDERSON REINHART
144 See id. at *18-22 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
145 See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3542 (June 12, 1992)
(employing factors important in a conflict of law analysis even though the issue concerned
the meaning of direct effect in deciding to hold the Republic of Argentina liable on its
bond obligations); Sabolyk v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, No. 84 Civ.
3179, 1984 WL 1275 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1984) (weighing New York's interests and deter-
mining that there would be no chilling effect in the area of letter of credit transactions if a
Swiss judgment were upheld).
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